how special is the special relationship

How special is the ‘Special Relationship’ (with special reference to Suez and the Iraq War)?

Introduction.

One of the most discussed, reviled and yet celebrated relationships the United Kingdom (UK) has with the wider world, is that of the ‘Special Relationship’ with the United States (US).

The penguin dictionary of international relations describes it as “part of international rhetoric...and regarded as having permanent even structural basis ...” Evans and Newnham also espouse: “However the relationship, (except for brief periods during and after WW2) is rarely as affectionate as the term suggests” (Evans,G. & Newnham,J. 1998, p 506). The special relationship is ubiquitous in diplomatic dialogue (Langley 2006/2007), the US and the UK have ‘virtually integrated’ their defence and intelligence according to Wallace and Phillips ( p 264,2009) and the relationship orbits between intimacy and mistrust, dependant on global political circumstances, Morgan, (2001). The UK has economic, legal and strategic alliances with other states (Maguire, S. & Smith, M. 2008); as does the US, professing to have Special Relationships with France, Germany Israel and South Korea (Bilefsky 2007).

Caveat; The specialness of the relationship cannot be denied, however it also depends on what is meant by ‘special’, there are various meanings in the Oxford English dictionary for example:

1. designed or organised for a particular person, purpose, or occasion;

2. better, greater, or otherwise different from what is usual;

3. particularly great or important, or having an extra quality,

(Oxford Dictionaries 2006)

This essay will explore the ‘special relationship’ and state how close to the characteristics of “special” [it] is based on findings.

History, 1776 and beyond:

The US was a colony of Britain until the 1776 declaration and war of Independence, in the years following, relations between the two countries were sporadic and littered with mistrust, despite fighting alongside one another in minor conflicts leading up to, and in WW1 (Bayliss 1984).

Investigating the historical background, it is apparent that the US has argued against imperialism loudly on the world stage (McCormick 1999), suggesting Britain is a main perpetrator of this heinous crime,’ tantamount to burglary’, particularly Eisenhower during the Suez crisis (Dockhill 2002). Nevertheless, the US has embarked on many an imperialist adventure: in Cuba during the Spanish war of independence and the Bay of Pigs debacle, in Panama, Honduras, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua and Chile (Keen 2008). Suggesting it shares (with UK) the philosophy of intervening in ‘less mature’ or ‘able states’ affairs whist espousing a vehement dislike of imperialism. The US has a form of ‘protectorate’ that began in the late 19thc and is still thriving today (Keen 2008). This Pax Americana has been described a natural progression from Pax Britannia and begins to explain why the relationship is special (Azubuike 2005) it is partly because of a shared vision of the future, a perusal of liberal democracy, forced or otherwise (Naughtie 2004).

Furthermore, it could be suggested that these interventionist adventures were an extension an ideology: the right of all people to over throw tyrannical government, (albeit with the assistance of an hegemonic state such as the US). Grounded in the US’ constitution the declaration of independence states: “...whenever any form of Government becomes destructive of these ends (that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights), it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government,” (Himmelfarb 1990). Therefore, it can be asserted that the declaration of independence may shed some light as to why Britain and the US disagreed over Suez, Vietnam, the Falklands and Grenada yet were close allies in other conflicts such as the Gulf war, Kosovo and the Iraq war (Himmelfarb 1990, Morgan, K.O 2001). It could be the insisting of one country that it has more noble purposes for trespassing on another states’ territory than the other, which has caused similar behaviour but differing rhetoric and the occasional alliance.

Even with shared philosophy (albeit not espoused), relations were strained in the mid war years and the U.S did not initially help Britain in WW2. For example: in the face of Churchill’s pleas for defunct US destroyers urging it was “a matter of life and death” Roosevelt refused insisting it was against congressional and public opinion (p3,Bayliss 1984). However, an agreement was made, exchanging the much needed destroyers for a 99 year lease allowing US Air and Naval bases on British Empire land (Bayliss 1984). It can be asserted that (this could be the beginning of the practical aspects special relationship, before the much quoted ‘Sinews of Peace’ speech of 1946 ,Wallace,W. & Phillips,C. 2009), and also shows the terms for the relationship in the future, one of engaging promises from the leaders with deals that leave Britain the poorer partner in the relationship.

Tangible and material aspects of the Relationship.

Having asserted the roots of the relationship are founded in imperialism (the political, military, or economic domination of one country over another) (Evans,G. & Newnham,J. 1998), and a shared denial of this imperialism, explaining that at the onset the US had the superior position this essay will explore concrete characteristics of the relationship.

After working closely in WW2 sharing intelligence, defence, operations and arms, (Wallace,W. & Phillips,C. 2009), the McMahon act (stopping all information sharing regarding nuclear science) came as a huge blow to Anglo-American relations and reasserted US’ control of the relationship (Bayliss 1984, Dockhill 2002). Britain continued developing atomic weaponry and energy as it’s scientists had been leading the field in the early 1940s, the two countries perused technology solo until the revision with the Burns templar agreement 1950; stating that the US and the UK share to the ‘greatest practical degree military and intelligence information’ (p 7;Bayliss 1984).

At present this agreement endures with other defence, intelligence and strategic cooperation policies being founded since; including military bases (over 15,000 US military personnel are employed in 8 bases) (Wallace,W. & Phillips,C. 2009) and the strategic sharing of nuclear war heads (enabling Britain able to compete globally in arena she truly could not financially afford to do) (Hendershot 2009).

Furthermore, in the last four conflicts the UK shared the human and financial cost of war. Although Britain has not enjoyed the rebuilding contracts the US has had and the UK has spent more money on Afghanistan in relation to GDP than the US at a rate of 110% to the US’ contribution, this will be discussed further on (Azubuike 2005, Wallace,W. & Phillips,C. 2009).

Realistically it can be argued the US and the UK both enjoy different facets of this agreement, the UK have defence abilities above her capabilities, influence in military decision making and is the only ‘level one partner’ in coalition with the US; the US have a smaller state to lend credibility to its actions (Azubuike 2005, Corera 2009). This is invaluable on the world stage, principally in lending integrity to US claim that it is not hegemonic but philanthropic (Bayliss 1984, Morgan, 2001).

Although, (raising some scepticism to the philanthropic and fraternal attitude the US purports to hold), it can be asserted that at the inception of this ‘Special relationship’ in defence policy, the US was keen to ensure the UK was not courted by the USSR and it is from a ‘dog in a manger attitude’ that ‘friendships’ were renewed.

For example: in 1947 the Soviets asked to buy 20 Nene and Derwent engines, from Clement Attlee’s government, (the Soviet planes at this time were incapable of making the journey to the US) but with these engines the threat of atomic strikes became very real to Washington; however, against the US’ recriminations and with mounting debts the British government sold the engines. Washington was outraged yet Britain ignored them, eventually Britain and the US entered into the Burns templar agreement and the McMahon act was scrapped (Engel 2003, Naughtie 2004). Britain and the US although allied in defence and intelligence; continue to act independently and against each other’s express wishes, on a number of military matters; including Suez and Vietnam, this leans toward the relationship being special in purpose, or occasion.

Finance and Culture

In his book American academic Dr Robert Hendershot states that there is no relationship anywhere else in contemporary Global politics like the one between Britain and the United States, he suggests there are nebulous qualities that supersede the alliance of intelligence and weaponry, Hendershot insists that although [it] is changing and morphing due to power shifts the relationship is indestructible due to the value placed on Anglo- American relations by the U.S. electorate. Furthermore he suggests that the historical narrative is posthumously being transformed citing the involvement of Britain in the bicentenary celebrations as being evidence of this (Hendershot 2009). The Anglo-Saxon bloc share music, film television and fashion; these impact on values that exceed finance, it is a liberal capitalist shared view made concrete by language and popular culture (Bayliss 1984, Naughtie 2004).

This assertion is undeniable, however beyond warm and fuzzy sentimentality, the relationship is not one of equals; as explained, the relationship began as part of a war time coalition, arguably between comparatively equal financial partners; Britain at this time had a large empire including India. However the war effort had a significant effect on the British economy leaving Britain heavily in debt; the US in this time became a ‘super power’ with industry flourishing and a time of plenty just beginning (Dock hill 2002).

After WW2 Britain became economically weak and faced decline, meanwhile the US under the Marshal plan (1947-1951) sent aid in the form of $12.5 billion to Western Europe to aid recovery (Azubuike 2005). Attached to this money was the clear assertion that the US expected a European federation to be created, Britain was not keen (McCormick 1999). Recovery in Western Europe left the UK behind, with both Germany and France overtaking Britain in economic performance. This had a profound effect internationally, making Britain a disadvantaged state, in economic and financial diplomacy (Williams, & Phillips 2009).

Therefore although Britain and the US are bound by language, culture and history (Naughtie 2004) it is not a relationship held between equals. Furthermore, in the 1950s the economic might of the US reined over the whole globe, this meant that no concerted action could be taken without America’s agreement (Azubuike 2005); it was under these conditions that Suez erupted.

Suez a catastrophe amongst crises

The Suez canal, considered the British Empire’s jugular east-west connection, was legally owned by a coalition of French and UK share holders and carried a right of free passage set by the Constantinople convention of 1888 (Bayliss 1984).

The Suez crisis described as ‘Britain’s last spin of the imperial dice’ was motivated by Gamal Abdel Nasser’s decision to capture the Suez Canal and nationalise it to pay for the Aswan Dam; a project which would increase hydro-electrical power and enlarge arable land (Dunne 1990). This project was essential to plans for Egypt’s development, both internally and by increasing supply for export markets (Dockhill 2002).

At this time British colonies were (although depleted) still considerable, including: Singapore, Malaya, Hong Kong, much of the Caribbean and Africa (Guardian 2001). Having the canal under Egypt’s control was both ‘embarrassing and unacceptable’ according to the Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who also demonised Nasser likening him to Hitler or Mussolini (Morgan, 2001). Britain was not prepared to concede control of the canal, thus with the aid of France and Israel, a military operation was planned to reclaim the territory; ignoring the U.N general assembly who prohibited the action with overwhelming negative votes, (Dockhill 2002).

In addition this annexing by Nasser was a consequence of the US’ decision not to finance the Aswan dam project, believing it to be anti-Israel and pro-Soviet. Britain also withdrew a promise of financial support believing it to be a risk the British were unable to take without the US (Dockhill 2002), not surprising given the facts above.

However, the US was engaged in warily scrutinising the events of the Hungarian revolution and could not criticize USSR for hegemonic behaviour and “boast of moral superiority to the emerging third world, whilst assisting Britain and France storming the Suez Canal” (p63, McCormick 1999). Therefore, the US not only, did not assist, but condemned the action in virulent terms, also threatening to withdraw support for a nearly bankrupt Sterling if Eden did not depart from Egypt immediately; the UK capitulated. Furthermore, the US furious because of the devious way the action in Egypt had taken place, cut back intelligence sharing to a bare minimum (Morgan, 2001). As a result Eden finally realised that Britain was not capable of action independent of the US (McCormick 1999).

It can be asserted that Suez was a turning point for the ‘Special Relationship’; Britain was humiliated and the United States was considered the dominant partner from then on. In the years following, the Empire declined further with almost all Crown colonies becoming independent by 1981 (Morgan, 2001); meanwhile the US grew in stature holding Bi-Polar Super power status whilst engaged in the cold war with the USSR, and finally the claim that the U.S. had won the cold war and was the world’s only Super Power (Maguire, S. & Smith, M. 2008).

The Suez crisis’ effect on the Special relationship was profound; Bayliss states “Suez demonstrated the limits and fragility of the Special relationship, which both countries had carefully built in the 1940/50s...Both Dulles and Eden seemed to have regarded the clash of interests involved more important than the Anglo-American Alliance” (p 7; Bayliss 1984). This is a theme that reappears repeatedly, ultimately proving the relationship flourishes when there are shared goals, this will be discussed below with reference to Iraq. In addition to this assertion it can be suggested Suez set another president: the ignoring of the U.N. in matters of security.

Iraq a pathological partnership

On September 11^th 2001 the U.S were subject to a terrorist attack which killed over 3000 people; this changed U.S security dramatically and led to a close coalition between Britain and the U.S, in two wars over the next 8 years (Naughtie 2004)

Described as the most serious foreign policy crisis since Suez (Azubuike 2005); the Iraq war of 2003 brought the U.K. into a coalition that defied the U.N, members of the British cabinet and resulted in record breaking protests held worldwide in opposition to the war (BBC 2011). It is this defiance that has led to charges of Britain being a pawn or poodle in its relationship with the U.S; by embarking on an illegal war (Corera 2009).

However, Britain led the coalition with the U.S and there were 21 contributing armed forces to the Coalition in Iraq. These 21 countries were: Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, South Korea, and the United Kingdom (Pike 2006).

Although no other coalition member came close to spending as much money (Wallace & Phillips; 2009), or sending as many troops. For example: Britain sent 18,000 troops, resulting in 179 British Ministry of Defence personnel deaths (including 136 combatant deaths) (MOD 2009), there have been 4439 U.S military deaths (9/11 Comission 2004) and 11 Spanish (Pike 2006).

Furthermore, on the subject of the 9/11 attacks, defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld pronounced “that from this day forward the mission must determine the coalition, the coalition must not determine the mission” (p 11, Gnesotto et. al 2003), it can be asserted that this means Britain had no choice but to agree to the war in Iraq; as this was the U.S’ intention, the coalition members irrelevant as it were.

However, Azubuike (2005) espouses (in his examination of the special relationship) there was no significant political or ideological pressure to agree to the Iraq war; in fact majority opinion was distinctly realist (no one has the right to enter sovereign territory). Iraq was and is considered an illegal war (BBC 2011), there were no financial or monetary pressures which the US could have used to force Britain to agree to do it’s bidding, (as it did at the time of Suez) and there was significant pressure both nationally, within Europe and the U.N to not go into Iraq. Also, there were no significant economic interests for Britain to protect by assisting in the invasion of Iraq. British oil companies stood to lose more than they gained (Azubuike 2005). Therefore Blair must have had prevailing reasons to become part of this much maligned endeavour.

This paper asserts the special relationship reached a zenith during the office of Tony Blair 1997-2008, relations between Tony Blair and Bill Clinton had been described as affable and friendly, the two men (both on the middle right of the left; proclaiming New Labour and New Democrats for their respective campaigns) were obvious companions sharing social time as well as the dictates of office (Naughtie 2004, Blair 2010 (c)).

Blair undeniably had influence on Clinton, for example: during the 1999 Kosovo conflict it was [him] who informed and shaped US policy, persuading Clinton to deploy ground troops, considered essential to the campaign (Blair, 2010).

Furthermore this influence was respected by Clinton who espoused; (in the aftermath of 9/11) “that he had confidence in Blair’s influence expecting him to be able to restrain Bush from any hasty attack on Iraq. He observed that Blair’s consistent bullish attitude on Iraq and the need to deal with the threat from Saddam Hussein would make him quite effective behind the scenes” (p 136 Azubuike 2005).

Analysing the relationship held with George Bush; Blair explains that although their politics on a national level were polar opposites, disagreeing on social care, health and educations his relationship with Bush regarding 9/11 was immediate support. Britain would stand shoulder to shoulder with America, and he recalls the ‘chilling’ events of 9/11 espousing that the world had changed irrevocably (Blair 2010 (b)). This rhetoric is reminiscent of Churchill’s however, unlike 1946 there appears to be no benefit to the U.K at this time of supporting the U.S so it can be asserted that the reasons explained previously; of shared culture and the nebulous qualities of the relationship are the cause of the support in the Iraq war. In addition, it can be claimed that with shared intelligence (thus intelligence staff) and a core belief (perhaps misjudged) in a desire to eliminate weapons of mass destruction allegedly held by Sadam Hussain, the special relationship had found its ultimate apex .

Perhaps sentiment of perceived threat to western civilisation was the nemesis for this action, furthermore, although there were terrorist attacks in the heart of London in 2005 and Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi was arrested in Iraq (to be detained at Guantanmo bay) for masterminding those bombings, it is 9/11 that dominates the discourse on Iraq ( O’Neill, Reid and Evans 2007) although this arrests contravenes human rights law and is contested.

It is fair to maintain that like Fidel Castro in his speech of 16 October 1953, history will absolve the actions and prove the foundations of the Special relationship at this time (Keen 2008). Dialogue regarding Iraq is fraught with disagreement the premiers argue their case to this day and neither espouses regret for their actions, it is possible therefore that at this point in history; two very similarly minded men tackled an international crises with opinions that despite huge opposition happened to agree with one another, this may be the cause of the Special Relationship being in revival and altogether more influential. The specialness was due to being ... organised for a particular person,(Blair-Bush) purpose (9/11 and further threat) , or occasion (the war in Iraq) (Oxford Dictionaries 2006).

Conclusion

It can be claimed in answer to: “How special is the ‘Special Relationship’ (with special reference to Suez and the Iraq War)?” that [it] is Special, special does not mean equal nor does it mean fair this paper asserts:

The evidence shows the relationship is special, having nuances of “particular importance, having an extra quality” (Oxford Dictionaries 2006), because the nations share a language, culture and many customs; there are agreements in trade, intelligence, defence, operations, and weaponry, so although swathed by rhetoric, there is a factual basis for the term (Bayliss 1984;Hendershot 2009).

As was discussed above the relationship is most advantageous to both when the states’ share a goal, utilising this meaning of special “designed or organised for a particular person, purpose, or occasion” (Oxford Dictionaries 2006); although having the U.K disagree with international action does not affect the U.S to the extent the reverse effects the U.K (as has been shown with Suez) (Azubuike 2005). Thus the U.S. holds the superior power in the relationship; however, it would be difficult for the U.S. to alienate the U.K. entirely due to the perceptions of the American electorate (Naughtie 2004, Hendershot 2009).

This term has endured over 60 years, with a total of 23 changes of Premier and is espoused to be ongoing by the present incumbent heads of state, despite insincere press coverage targeted at the term, (Naughtie 2004;BBC 2010b;Blair 2010;Darling 2011). Moreover, although the press make much of personal relationships between premiers it is not this that is a basis for the international success or failure of the relationship; but it does add to the specialness as described above.

It is “better, greater, or otherwise different from what is usual” (Oxford Dictionaries 2006) in that often in the past 60 years British and American premiers have shared relationships different and what appears closer than that which is usual in global politics particularly: Churchill-Roosevelt; Thatcher-Reagan and Blair-Clinton-Bush (Inboden 2010).

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